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The ruling of the Fifth Circuit firmly establishes in Texas the right
of both equitable relief and recovery of damages in tort for improper
acquisition of a trade secret. The effect of this case dispels any vestiges
of the theory that Texas will allow recovery only if a breach of confidence or fraudulent or illegal conduct are involved. The method of
discovery, whether proper or improper, is determinative of both the
right to equitable relief against further dissemination of the trade
secret and the right of recovery in damages for tort.
Ronald R. Winfrey

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPRISONMENT OF AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT FOR FAILURE To PAY A FINE CONSTITUTES AN INVIDIOUS
DISCRIMINATION, ON THE BASIS OF WEALTH, VIOLATING THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT. In re Antazo, 89

Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. 1970).
Simeon Munsell Antazo and Steven Clausman were convicted of
arson. The trial judge stated that he considered both defendants "as
standing in the same and identical shoes before the Court with respect
to responsibility for these matters." The court placed both defendants
on probation for three years upon the condition that each pay a $2,500
fine and a 25 per cent penalty assessment; or in lieu of payment, to be
imprisoned one day for each $10 of the unpaid balance. The petitioner
(Antazo), being unable to pay the fine, was ordered confined for a
period not to exceed 312 days. The codefendant (Clausman) paid the
fine and was set free. The petitioner's prayer for a writ of habeas corpus
alleged that his rights under the 14th amendment's equal protection

clause were violated in that he was discriminated against solely because
of his indigency. Held-writ granted. Imprisonment of an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine constitutes an invidious discrimination,
on the basis of wealth, violating the equal protection clause of the 14th

amendment.
In Griffin v. Illinois the United States Supreme Court ruled that
"[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of

poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."' The Court stated
that people who are charged with a crime must "stand on an equality
before the bar of justice in every American court ' 2 and there cannot
be "invidious discrimination between persons and different groups of
1 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898 (1956).
2 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898 (1956), citing
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241, 60 S. Ct. 472, 479, 84 L. Ed. 716, 724 (1939).
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persons." 8 The Court emphasized that the financial status of the defendant should have no bearing on the judicial proceeding and "there can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has." 4 In spite of Griffin's requirement that all
defendants be treated equally, two-thirds of the states continued to
permit indigent defendants to be confined for a period in excess of the
offense's statutory maximum.5 Four of these states still consider as equal
treatment a one dollar deduction of the defendant's fine for every day
spent in prison." Since Griffin, the principle of equality before the law,
and the practice of imprisoning an indigent defendant for non-payment
of a fine, have paradoxically
been upheld. 7 The constitutionality of the
"pay or jail" statutes8 has consistently been affirmed but the application
of the statutes has been subjected to strict scrutiny. 0
New York was the first state to recognize the possible application of
Griffin to the "pay or jail" statute. In People v. Saffore'O the defendant
was sentenced to one year imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine
for the commission of a misdemeanor. The maximum imprisonment in
New York State for any misdemeanor is one year." The indigent defendant was ordered confined for one year plus one day for every dollar
fined. This could have resulted in an 865 day imprisonment. The
court of appeals used Griffin's language saying that an affirmance of
this case would allow different treatment for the defendant who can pay
a fine and the defendant who was unable to pay. 12 The court stated
that since imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine can be validly used
only as a method of collection to reassure the payment of the fine,
then any imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum is but "... an
illegal method of requiring imprisonment far beyond the maximum
8 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 589, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898 (1956).
4Id. at 19, 76 S. Ct. at 591, 100 L. Ed. at 899.
5 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 2025-2030, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586, 595-603
(1970).
6 Id. There are actually five states that credit the defendant with a deduction of a dollar
a day but Arizona provides that the indigent cannot be imprisoned beyond the statutory
maximum. Arkansas, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wyoming direct that the indigent defendant shall be imprisoned until the fine is paid by imprisonment at the rate of one dollar a day.
7 Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), 345 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 911, 86 S. Ct. 254, 15 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1965). Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F.
Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968); People v. Saffore, 218 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1966); Sawyer v. District
of Columbia, 238 A.2d 814 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); People v. Williams, 244 N.E.2d 197
(Ill. 1969).
8 See, e.g.,TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.03 (1966): When a judgment and sentence
have been rendered against a defendant for a pecuniary fine, if he is present, he shall
be imprisoned in jail until discharged as provided by law. This article is referred to as the
"pay or jail" statute and for purposes of this Note, all articles in different states will also
be referred to as "pay or jail" statutes.
9 E.g., Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
10 218 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1966).
11 NEw YORK PENAL CODE ANN. BOOK 89, art. 10.00(4) (1967).
12 People v. Saffore, 218 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1966).
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term of imprisonment allowed by the statute .... ."I In Sawyer v. District of Columbia,14 the court recognized the need to apply the "pay
or jail" statute in compliance with the equality principle pronounced
in Griffin. Rather than viewing the statute as a violation of the equal
protection clause, the court examined the discretionary role of the
judge.'8 In Sawyer the court said:
[I]n every case in which the defendant is indigent, a sentence
of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine which exceeds the
maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed under
the substantive statute as an original sentence is an invalid exercise
of the court's discretion for the reason that its only conceivable
purpose is to impose a longer term of punishment than is permitted
by law.16
...

The court stated that if the alternate sentences and default imprisonment were used to mete out longer prison terms than the statutory
maximum then the very purpose of the statute would have been subverted. "If this can be done then a longer imprisonment can be imposed
on a poor person than on one with means. Such is not the purpose of
17
the law."'
In Williams v. Illinois,18 the United States Supreme Court substantially followed the New York reasoning that aggregate imprisonment
could not exceed the maximum statutory confinement. "Applying the
teaching of the Griffin case here, we conclude that an indigent criminal
defendant may not be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by the statute regulating the substantive
offense."' 19 The Court did not say the "pay or jail" sentence was unconstitutional; only that it could become unconstitutional when applied
solely to indigents. 20 "[A] law nondiscriminatory on its face may be
grossly discriminatory in its operation. ' 21 The Court said the defendant
did not actually have a choice of paying the fine or selecting imprisonment. "The 'choice' of paying $100 fine or spending 30 days in jail
is really no choice at all to the person who cannot raise $100."22 The
la Id. at 687.
14 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
15 Compare in Peeples v. District of Columbia, 75 A.2d 845 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950),
the court warned that future courts "ought" not to allow imprisonment beyond the
statutory maximum. Sawyer v. District of Columbia said that it would be an invalid
exercise of discretionary power if the court did allow imprisonment beyond the statutory
maximum.
16 Id. at 318.
17 Id. at 317.
18 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970).
19 Id. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 2022, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 593.
20 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970).
21 Id. at -,
90 S. Ct. at 2023, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 593, where the court quoted Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898 (1956).
22 Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 205, 221 (1964).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2022], No. 2, Art. 10

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2

invidious discrimination was that an affluent defendant could pay the
fine and escape any further deprivation of liberty while the indigent
would be spending a period in jail which exceeded the maximum punishment for the offense. Williams said that it was a violation of the
equal protection clause for an indigent to be imprisoned beyond the
statutory maximum, but the Court did not say it would be an invidious
discrimination against the indigent defendant simply because he was not
afforded the same choice as the affluent defendant.2 This question was
answered by the Supreme Court of California two months later in
In Re Antazo. 24 The rationale used by the California court in declaring
"pay or jail" statutes unconstitutional is substantially the same argument utilized in Williams. The difference is that the California court
determined the practice of imprisoning convicted indigent defendants
for nonpayment was not necessary to promote the compelling interest
the state had in collecting fines. 25 The court stated that equal protection6
2
does not require "absolute equality" and quoted Douglas v. California:
".. . a state can, consistently with the Fourteeenth Amendment

provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a
denial of due process or an 'invidious discrimination.' "27
Classifications are constitutional when shown to be necessary to promote

a compelling governmental interest. 28 In Antazo, the court stated "....

somewhat in the manner of the court in Williams, we assume that the
state's interest in the collection of fines and in the reformation and rehabilitation of the convicted defendants is 'substantial and legitimate.' ",29 This compelling interest would have been sufficient to warrant classification between the indigent and the affluent if the state could
have shown that it was necessary in order to promote the governmental
interest. The state had contended that imprisonment was necessary as a
method of enforcing payment but this was held to be false. The court
found that "[a]s applied to indigents we fail to see how either the
threat or the actuality of imprisonment can force a man who is with23 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970).
24 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. 1970).
25 Id. at 265.
26 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356, 83 S. Ct. 814, 816, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 814 (1963).
27 In Re Antazo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. 1970).
28 Two examples where the court has ruled that the classifications were not constitutional.
In Shapiro v. Thornp son' 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), the
Supreme Court said that a residence requirement for one year in order to collect welfare
is violative of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, in that it establishes
a classification which is not based on a compelling interest of the state. In Castro v. State,
466 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1970), the Supreme. Court of California said that a state may not
establish a classification between voters and nonvoters based only on the fact that one
group may not be literate in English. The classification would not be necessary in carrying
out a compelling governmental interest and would violate the equal protection clause of
the 14th amendment.
29 In Re Antazo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 262 (Cal. 1970).
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out funds, to pay a fine."8 0 The court reasoned that it would not be
a necessary classification, even if it was an effective means of enforcing
payment, because there are many other methods of collection which
could be used.31 The state contended they had an interest in the reformation and rehabilitation of convicted defendants. 82 The California Supreme Court found that "[s]ince the state may thus promote its interest
in rehabilitation directly, imprisonment of the indigent offender for
nonpayment of his fine should not be necessary."838
The court concluded that the state had a substantial interest in the
collection of fines, however, the imprisonment of the indigent defendant
was not necessary to promote this compelling interest. The classification
between the indigent and the affluent constituted an invidious discrimination prohibited by the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.3 4

The Declaration of Independence stated that all men are created
equal. The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court spoke of the "free
air" of the American people.3 5 In 1891, the Supreme Court of the
United States said that the 14th amendment ". . . requires that no
different or higher punishment shall be imposed on one that is imposed
on all for like offenses .. .. "36 In 1956, the Supreme Court of the
United States said that the 14th amendment ".

.

. requires that no

"... stand on an equality before the bar of justice in the American
37

Court."

It is difficult to comprehend how the United States could maintain
for almost 200 years an "archaic system akin to imprisonment for
debt. ' 38 Sentencing Antazo to 312 days in prison and freeing his codefendant amounted to no more than buying and selling liberty. The
Magna Carta pronounced that "...we will sell to no man, we will not
80 Id.

at 263.
81 ld. at 264. The court referred to Williams v. Illinois which had suggested two
alternate methods:
(1) cost and fine could be collected through an installment plan;
2) imposition of a parole requirement specifying certain tasks which the indigent must
perform during the day.
82 1d. at 263. The court mentioned that there are only a few examples of an analysis
of default imprisonment in terms of the relationship between imprisonment of indigents
and the state's interest which is to be promoted. The opinion in Strattman v. Studt, 253
N.E.2d 749 (Ohio 1969) analyzed the problem in this fashion and concluded that the state
does have a compelling interest. The court said that imprisonment is necessary to promote
the punitive, retributive and rehabilitative interest when the defendant is unable to pay
the fine.
83 ld. at 264.
84 Id. at 265.
85 Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 205, 227 (1964).
86 In Re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 632, 11 S. Ct. 191, 193, 34 L Ed. 796, 799 (1891).
87 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590, 100 L. Ed. 891, 898 (1956), citing
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241; 60 S. Ct. 472, 479, 84 L. Ed. 716, 724 (1939).
88 People v. McMillian, 279 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Orange County Ct. 1967).
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